There are as many different Islamic denominations in Denmark as there are Christian, and many imams fear being met with skepticism if they speak publicly. These are some of the reasons why it's impossible to find a unified Muslim voice in the social debates, according to the first PHD thesis on imams in Denmark.
It was very misleading that imam Abu Laban of the Islamic Faith Society showed up as the spokesperson for the country's Muslims during the Mohammed crisis.
Many of the imams in Denmark belong to three different ethnic groups and within each group there are many different religious denominations, which don't always agree with each other.
This according to Inge Liengaard, PHD at the Theological Faculty at Aarhus University, who is the first Danish research to have prepared a deep analysis of imams from all ethnic groups in Denmark.
Liengaard says that Abu Laban was a shrewd politician in many ways. He was used to grabbing the opportunity to get a message across in the media, and many Danes are under the impression that he was the Muslim's spokesperson in Denmark. In reality he represented a small group of Muslims, who are mostly of Arab background. Many other Muslims disagree with his interpretation of Islam.
The researcher has interviewed 20 of the most powerful imams and has analyzed their mutual relations of leaders of the country's mosques. She has found out that most mosques are organized according to ethnic groups with Arab, Turkish and Pakistani mosques being the most widespread.
Within every group there are different religious subgroups, just as people know from the different denominations in Christianity among the Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant churches.
Muslim's ethnicity has meaning for both cooperation and competition between mosques. Imams and mosques typically barely work together across ethnic lines, aside from specific cases such as for example for a Muslim cemetery. During the Muhammed crisis people spoke mainly with the Arab imams and did not pay attention to the Turkish and Pakistani imams. It's thought provoking. First that they weren't asked, and second that they did not feel the need to step forward.
Mostly people ignore other ethnic groups and are only in competition with mosques who turn to the same potential customers, with the same language and the same cultural and historical background.
Liengaard explains that denominations among Muslims are related to where they come from. A Turk and Arab imam don't address the same public. First, there are two different languages, and there are many cultural, social and historical relations that cause a Turk to prefer to go to a Turkish mosque, when he does so. Therefore the internal competition is strongest.
The sharp division between imams in Denmark is part of the explanation why people never hear Muslims speak in one unified voice in the public debate.
On the whole, imams seldom involve themselves in social debates, as Abu Laban did during the Muhammed crisis both in Denmark and abroad. This is because many consciously hold back from getting involved.
Turkish imams generally keep a low profile, because they are educated in secular Turkey and many are sent out through the Turkish religion ministry. They do not want to publicly get involved in the Danish situation. Many other imams are concerned they would end up on the front page of BT or Ekstra Bladet if they speak publicly.
Liengaard says that it's become so difficult to be a Muslim and have religious point of view in Denmark, that imams have difficulty to speak out without looking bad. They can't say anything without it being used against them. Many therefore think that no attention is better than bad attention.
One of Liengaards conclusions in her thesis is that even if imams usually attract attention from the press, they continue to be isolated at the sidelines of Danish society. And this is done by the Danish themselves.
As leaders of mosques, imams are often seen as strong, Muslim authorities. But only 10% of Danish Muslims go to Friday prayers in a mosque. Therefore, every imams in reality represents only a limited section of the country's 200,000 Muslims. Imams find themselves in a paradoxical situation: one the one hand they are viewed by the Danish public as influential, because they are religious authorities. On the other hand, they are disqualified as debaters in the public debate because they are religious authorities.
This means that imams, unlike priests, find it more difficult to use their authority to get influence in other areas of society. For example, it's hard to image an imam as a member of a board or council.
Liengaard, says that there is no symbolic capital associated with being an imam in relation to the surrounding society. Internally in Muslim circles it might be recognized, but more generally they are not viewed as positive contributors to society. Imagine an imams on the board of Aarhus University. It's impossible, she says, referring to the Danish bishop Kjeld Holm.
The imams are otherwise at least as well educated as their Danish 'colleagues'. Liengaard's interview shows that many have prolonged religious education of between seven and thirteen years. They typically start at a religious high school and later continue on to a religious university. Some, mostly Arab, imams have shorter religious education, but on the other hand also have a secular education as, for example, historians, engineers or metalworkers.
Source: Videnskab (Danish)
See also: Europe: Morocco sends imams for Ramadan, Germany: Most imams unable to help integration
It was very misleading that imam Abu Laban of the Islamic Faith Society showed up as the spokesperson for the country's Muslims during the Mohammed crisis.
Many of the imams in Denmark belong to three different ethnic groups and within each group there are many different religious denominations, which don't always agree with each other.
This according to Inge Liengaard, PHD at the Theological Faculty at Aarhus University, who is the first Danish research to have prepared a deep analysis of imams from all ethnic groups in Denmark.
Liengaard says that Abu Laban was a shrewd politician in many ways. He was used to grabbing the opportunity to get a message across in the media, and many Danes are under the impression that he was the Muslim's spokesperson in Denmark. In reality he represented a small group of Muslims, who are mostly of Arab background. Many other Muslims disagree with his interpretation of Islam.
The researcher has interviewed 20 of the most powerful imams and has analyzed their mutual relations of leaders of the country's mosques. She has found out that most mosques are organized according to ethnic groups with Arab, Turkish and Pakistani mosques being the most widespread.
Within every group there are different religious subgroups, just as people know from the different denominations in Christianity among the Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant churches.
Muslim's ethnicity has meaning for both cooperation and competition between mosques. Imams and mosques typically barely work together across ethnic lines, aside from specific cases such as for example for a Muslim cemetery. During the Muhammed crisis people spoke mainly with the Arab imams and did not pay attention to the Turkish and Pakistani imams. It's thought provoking. First that they weren't asked, and second that they did not feel the need to step forward.
Mostly people ignore other ethnic groups and are only in competition with mosques who turn to the same potential customers, with the same language and the same cultural and historical background.
Liengaard explains that denominations among Muslims are related to where they come from. A Turk and Arab imam don't address the same public. First, there are two different languages, and there are many cultural, social and historical relations that cause a Turk to prefer to go to a Turkish mosque, when he does so. Therefore the internal competition is strongest.
The sharp division between imams in Denmark is part of the explanation why people never hear Muslims speak in one unified voice in the public debate.
On the whole, imams seldom involve themselves in social debates, as Abu Laban did during the Muhammed crisis both in Denmark and abroad. This is because many consciously hold back from getting involved.
Turkish imams generally keep a low profile, because they are educated in secular Turkey and many are sent out through the Turkish religion ministry. They do not want to publicly get involved in the Danish situation. Many other imams are concerned they would end up on the front page of BT or Ekstra Bladet if they speak publicly.
Liengaard says that it's become so difficult to be a Muslim and have religious point of view in Denmark, that imams have difficulty to speak out without looking bad. They can't say anything without it being used against them. Many therefore think that no attention is better than bad attention.
One of Liengaards conclusions in her thesis is that even if imams usually attract attention from the press, they continue to be isolated at the sidelines of Danish society. And this is done by the Danish themselves.
As leaders of mosques, imams are often seen as strong, Muslim authorities. But only 10% of Danish Muslims go to Friday prayers in a mosque. Therefore, every imams in reality represents only a limited section of the country's 200,000 Muslims. Imams find themselves in a paradoxical situation: one the one hand they are viewed by the Danish public as influential, because they are religious authorities. On the other hand, they are disqualified as debaters in the public debate because they are religious authorities.
This means that imams, unlike priests, find it more difficult to use their authority to get influence in other areas of society. For example, it's hard to image an imam as a member of a board or council.
Liengaard, says that there is no symbolic capital associated with being an imam in relation to the surrounding society. Internally in Muslim circles it might be recognized, but more generally they are not viewed as positive contributors to society. Imagine an imams on the board of Aarhus University. It's impossible, she says, referring to the Danish bishop Kjeld Holm.
The imams are otherwise at least as well educated as their Danish 'colleagues'. Liengaard's interview shows that many have prolonged religious education of between seven and thirteen years. They typically start at a religious high school and later continue on to a religious university. Some, mostly Arab, imams have shorter religious education, but on the other hand also have a secular education as, for example, historians, engineers or metalworkers.
Source: Videnskab (Danish)
See also: Europe: Morocco sends imams for Ramadan, Germany: Most imams unable to help integration
